More Trouble for Regular Probabilities by Parker, Matthew W.
 More Trouble for Regular Probabilities1 
Matthew W. Parker 
Centre for Philosophy of Natural and Social Science 
 
Abstract.  In standard probability theory, probability zero is not the same as impossibility.  
However, many have suggested that it should be—that only impossible events should have 
probability zero.  In cases where infinitely many outcomes have equal probability, regularity 
requires that some probabilities are infinitesimal, but merely introducing infinitesimals does not 
solve all of the problems with regularity.  We will see that regular probabilities are not invariant 
over rigid transformations, even for simple, bounded, countable, constructive, and disjoint sets of 
possible outcomes.  Hence, regular chances cannot be determined by space-time invariant 
physical laws, and regular credences cannot satisfy seemingly reasonable symmetry principles.  
Moreover, the examples here are immune to the objections against Williamson’s infinite coin 
flips. 
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1 This paper was first posted on Scribd on 21 July, 2012.  
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In standard probability theory, events with probability zero are not necessarily 
impossible.  Suppose for example that a dart will land on a dartboard in one of infinitely 
many positions.  (The dart does not have to be infinitely fine or perfectly symmetrical.)  
Assume also that these outcomes all have the same real-valued probability.  If that 
probability were not zero, then the probabilities of the possible outcomes would add up to 
more than one, violating the Kolmogorov probability axioms.  In fact, some finite number 
of them would add up to more than one.  So in fact the probability of each such outcome 
must be zero.  Yet one of them must occur.  So on the standard theory, probability-zero 
events are not only possible, they occur all the time.   
Many have suggested that this should not be so—that probabilities should be 
regular, i.e., only impossible events should be assigned probability zero (Carnap [1950], 
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[1963]; Kemeny [1955], [1963]; Shimony [1955], Jeffreys [1961], Edwards, Lindman, 
and Savage [1963], De Finetti [1964], Stalnaker [1970], Lewis [1980], Skyrms [1980], 
Appiah [1985], Jackson [1987], Jeffrey [1992]).  To those schooled in the standard 
theory, this may seem like a naïve misconception, but it is not unmotivated.  For 
objective chances, regularity encodes the seemingly sensible principle that the possible is 
more likely than the impossible.  For credences it represents a reasonable willingness to 
update one’s expectations in light of evidence, since credences of zero cannot be 
modified by Bayesian updating.  There is also a betting argument:  On standard 
definitions of credence, assigning credence zero to an event means you will accept a bet 
in which, if the event occurs, you sacrifice something of value, and if it doesn’t, you gain 
nothing.  Such an agreement seems irrational if there is any possibility that the event 
could occur (Shimony [1955], Kemeney [1955], [1963]).2   
And regularity is achievable, even in cases where infinitely many possible 
outcomes have the same probability, provided we are willing to permit not only real-
valued probabilities but hyperreals, which include real numbers, infinitesimals, and their 
sums.  (A number of authors have taken this approach, e.g., Bernstein and Wattenberg 
[1967], Lewis [1980], [1981], Nelson [1987], Benci, Horsten, and Wenmackers [2013].)  
Then we can assign a non-zero infinitesimal probability to each of the equally probable 
dart throw outcomes, so that a sum of finitely many such probabilities will not be greater 
than one.  The sum of a countable infinity of infinitesimals is not in general well defined, 
so to allow for hyperreal probabilities we must also relax the axiom of countable 
                                                
2 There is yet another motivation for regularity:  To eliminate the difficulty of conditionalizing on events of 
probability zero.  However, this can also be achieved by taking conditional probability as primitive, and 
there are independent arguments for that approach (Hájek [2003], Makinson [2011]).  
 4 
additivity to merely finite additivity.  That is, we do not require that the probability of a 
disjunction of a countable infinity of mutually exclusive events is the sum of the 
probabilities of the disjuncts, since that doesn’t always make sense; we only require that 
the probability of a disjunction of finitely many mutually exclusive events is the sum of 
the probabilities of the disjuncts.  And having so relaxed that requirement, we are free to 
assign a probability of one to the disjunction of all our dart throw outcomes.  So if we are 
willing to allow such relaxations of the standard definition of probability, our dartboard 
probabilities can be regular. 
However, Timothy Williamson ([2007]) has shown that, even if we allow 
infinitesimals and relax the additivity axiom, regularity still raises problems.  He 
considered the probability that an infinite sequence of coin flips will come out all 
heads—an extremely unlikely outcome, but strictly possible, so advocates of regularity 
would like to assign it non-zero probability.  But Williamson showed that if the 
probability such an event is determined by time-invariant laws, then it must be strictly 
zero, not a non-zero infinitesimal.  There are objections against Williamson (e.g., 
Weintraub [2008]), but here we will see a more general problem that is immune to the 
main objections.  Briefly, regular probabilities must vary under rigid transformations 
(rotations, translations, and reflections), not only for infinite sequences of events, but for 
individual events that occur in bounded space and time, such as dart throws and vacuum 
fluctuations.  Consequently, regular chances cannot be determined by space-time 
invariant laws, and regular credences cannot reflect epistemic indifference between 
symmetric events.  These are heavy prices to pay for regularity.  In light of such costs, the 
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arguments for regularity should be closely scrutinised, but we will not do that here.  We 
will only show that there are high costs not previously noted. 
Besides contributing to the case against a regularity requirement on probabilities, 
this paper has a second purpose.  Recent work has developed new alternatives to Cantor’s 
theory of set size (Katz [1981], Benci and Di Nasso [2003], Benci, Di Nasso, and Forti 
[2007]; see Mancosu [2009] and Parker [forthcoming] for discussion and further 
references).  Unlike Cantor’s theory of cardinals, “Euclidean” theories satisfy the 
Elements’ Common Notion 5, “The whole is greater than the part,” in the sense that, in 
Euclidean theories, a set is always larger than its proper subsets.  It is shown in Parker 
[forthcoming] that the sizes treated by such theories must be largely arbitrary, due in part 
to the fact that, in geometric contexts, they cannot be invariant under rigid 
transformations.  But it is suggested there that Euclidean sizes may nonetheless have 
useful applications in areas such as non-standard probability theory, for several authors 
have connected Euclidean notions of size with regular and hyperreal probabilities 
(McCall and Armstrong[1989], Gwiazda [2008], [2010], Wenmackers and Horsten 
[2013],  Benci, Horsten, and Wenmackers [2013]).  Here we will see that, in fact, the 
limitations of Euclidean set sizes are also significant limitations for regular probabilities.  
The failures of rigid transformation invariance, which carry over from Euclidean sizes to 
regular probabilities, imply that the attractive and plausible symmetries normally 
afforded by uniform distributions are not available.  So the second purpose of this paper 





2.1 Assumptions about probabilities 
As suggested above, we need to relax the standard axioms of probability a little in order 
to make regularity possible.  We need to permit infinitesimal values in addition to real 
numbers and substitute finite additivity for countable additivity.  But for our purposes, 
the axioms can be relaxed even more.  We only need a few assumptions about 
probabilities in order to show that regular probabilities are not invariant under rigid 
transformations.  Hence our conclusions will be quite general.  Even if we adopt a much 
more relaxed notion of probability, we can’t have a regular probability function that 
applies to the simple examples described below and is invariant under translations, 
rotations, or reflections.   
We will still assume that a probability space consists, as usual, of three 
components, a sample space S, an algebra D, and a probability function P.3  The sample 
space S is just any non-empty set.  In applications, it represents the mutually exclusive 
possible outcomes of some experiment or chance occurrence, such as the places where a 
dart could hit a dartboard.  The algebra D is a non-empty set of subsets of S that is closed 
under complementation as well as finitary union and intersection.  That is, 
(i) D contains at least one set, 
and if A and B are sets in D, then  
                                                
3 I am deliberately avoiding the Greek letters and script types traditionally used for the components of a 
probability space, as they tend to make simple matters seem more technical and intimidating. 
 7 
(ii) the complement S \ A (consisting of all elements of S that are not in A) is 
in D, and 
(iii) A Ç B is in D. 
It follows that for any A and B in D, A È B is also in D, as are S and Æ.  
Normally, the function P is a map from the algebra D into the real numbers.  Here 
we will require only that P maps D into some set F equipped with a relation ‘>’, an 
operation ‘+’, and an element ‘0’ such that  
(iv) for any x and y in F, if x > 0 then y + x > y,  
and 
(v) (finite additivity) if A and B are disjoint sets in D then P(A È B) = P(A) + 
P(B). 
These properties are all implied by the standard probability axioms.  There is a 
long tradition of arguments supporting those axioms, to the effect that, holding credences 
or ascribing chances that violate those axioms would be irrational, or at the very least 
disadvantageous (e.g., Ramsey [1931], De Finetti [1964], Joyce [1998], [2009], Leitgeb 
and Pettigrew [2010a], [2010b]).  However, such arguments usually attempt to justify 
finite additivity rather than the more controversial axiom of countable additivity (see 
Adams [1962–1964] and Williamson [1999] for noted exceptions), and most take the 
assumption that probabilities are real numbers, rather than hyperreals or something else, 
entirely for granted.  So it is not unreasonable to at least consider relaxing those 
assumptions, as we will here.  But our assumptions (i)–(v) have strong support, and are 
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also quite weak.  Besides following from the axioms of probability, they are implied by 
the definition of a measure or a finitely additive measure.  So our conclusions here apply 
not only to probabilities, but to a broad class of functions and notions of size.   
 
2.2 Regular probabilities 
Regularity can take strong and weak forms.  Let’s say that a probability function P is 
weakly regular if every non-empty set of possible outcomes that has a probability at all 
has probability greater than zero.  That is, if A Î D and A ≠ Æ then P(A) > 0.  We’ll say P 
is strongly regular if it is are weakly regular and P is defined on all subsets of S, i.e., if D 
is the entire power set P(S).  In applications, if P is only weakly regular but not strongly, 
this means there are some sets of possible outcomes that do not have positive probability, 
because they do not have probabilities at all.  Hájek [unpublished] gives several 
arguments that rational credences need not always be strongly regular, and in some cases 
shouldn’t be.4  But it is weak regularity that mainly concerns us here, for weak regularity 
                                                
4 Hájek also gives one argument that could be directed against weak regularity:  He claims that there is a 
difficulty in giving Kolmogorov-style axioms of probability that permit probability functions to have 
arbitrarily large nonstandard ranges:  “Just try providing an axiomatization along the lines of Kolmogorov’s 
that has flexibility in the range built into it,” he writes.  “If we don’t know exactly what the range is, “we 
don’t know what its notion of additivity will look like.”  But we have easily met this challenge with our 
weak requirements on the range and good old finite additivity.  Benci, Horsten, and Wenmackers [2013] 
have met it with a stricter set of axioms and a stronger additivity property analogous to countable 
additivity.  So it is not clear what the difficulty is supposed to be. 
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is enough to contradict rigid transformation invariance, provided that P is defined for just 
a few simple, bounded, Lebesgue-measurable5 point sets.  
 
2.3 Euclidean probabilities 
To see why regular probabilities don’t have rigid transformation invariance, we will use 
the following fact:  Given finite additivity or better, weak regularity implies 
Euclideanism.  As noted above, Euclidean set sizes satisfy Common Notion 5, ‘The 
whole is greater than the part’.  Similarly we will call a probability function Euclidean if 
a set of possible outcomes always has greater probability than any of its proper subsets 
(provided both sets have probabilities).  So P is Euclidean if for all sets A, B in D such 
that A is a proper subset of B, P(B) > P(A).  
It’s easy to see why weakly regular probabilities are always Euclidean:  If A is a 
proper subset of B then B = A È (B \ A) and B \ A is non-empty.  So if A and B have 
probabilities at all, then by additivity, P(B) = P(A) + P(B \ A), and by regularity, P(B \ A) 
> 0.  By (iv), then, P(B) > P(A).  Thus regularity implies that whenever A is a proper 
subset of B, P(B) > P(A), which is Euclideanism.6  
                                                
5 The Lebesgue measurable sets are those point sets in Euclidean space over which the Lebesgue measure is 
defined.  Lebesgue measure is the standard notion of total length, width, or n-dimensional volume in 
Euclidean space.  A full definition can readily be found on the Internet or in any analysis textbook. 
6 In fact, the converse holds as well, given finite additivity and the further postulate 
(vi) For any x and y in F, if x < 0 then y + x < y. 
For by finite additivity, P(A) = P(A È Æ) = P(A) + P(Æ) for any A Î D.  By (vi), this implies that P(Æ) > 0.  
But Æ is a proper subset of any non-empty set, so if P is Euclidean and Æ ≠ A Î D, then P(A) > P(Æ).  
Thus all non-empty sets in D have positive probability, i.e., P is weakly regular. 
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One can draw stronger connections between Euclidean set sizes and regular 
probabilities.  Benci, Horsten, and Wenmackers [2013] have introduced a theory of 
“Non-Archimedean Probabilities” (NAPs), which are regular probabilities closely related 
to a family of Euclidean set sizes called numerosities (Benci and di Nasso [2003], Benci, 
Di Nasso, and Forti [2007]).  If a NAP P is “fair”—if it assigns the same probability to 
each single-element subset of a sample space—then P(A) is just the numerosity of A 
divided by the numerosity of the sample space.   
NAPs have some nice features.  For one thing, they apply to all subsets of a 
continuum, not just certain “measurable” subsets, as in standard probability theory, and 
one can even obtain a total, finitely additive probability function with standard real 
values by taking the real parts of NAPs.  Such totality may be surprising to those familiar 
with non-measurable sets and the Banach-Tarski paradox, which seem to show that a 
reasonable measure cannot be defined over all point sets.  But totality comes at a cost, 
namely rigid transformation invariance.  The paradoxical appearance of non-measurable 
sets derives from the intuition that natural measures are translation- and rotation-
invariant.  For certain highly complex, non-constructive sets, such invariance turns out to 
be incompatible with additivity.  But here we will see that regular measures are even 
more limited:  A regular rigid transformation-invariant measure can’t even be defined on 
certain simple, countable, constructive, Lebesgue-measurable point sets in one-
dimensional space, even if we replace real-valued probabilities with hyperreals and 
countable additivity with finite additivity.  
Defenders of Euclideanism may feel that rigid transformation invariance should 
not be expected where a set includes a rigid transformation of itself as a proper subset.  
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After all, in their eyes, proper subsets are smaller.  But we will see examples where this 
argument doesn’t apply—where a set and its rotation or translation are not related by 
proper inclusion, and do not even overlap, but still cannot have the same probability if 
regularity holds. 
 
2.4 Uniform distributions 
A standard example in conventional real-valued probability theory is the uniform 
distribution over a bounded region of Euclidean space.  It’s given by the probability 
function Puniform(A) = L(A) / L(S), where L is Lebesgue measure, on the Lebesgue-
measurable subsets A of a region S.  If S is a subset of the real line, for example, then 
Puniform(A) is just the total length of A in units chosen so that Puniform(S) = 1 (provided A is 
Lebesgue measurable).  Under this probability function, all sets with Lebesgue measure 
zero have probability zero, and sets that are not Lebesgue measurable get no probability 
at all.  The term ‘uniform’ is justified by the fact that, for any real number r, Puniform 
assigns the same probability to all open balls of radius r, and more generally it assigns the 
same probability to any two geometrically congruent point sets (if those sets are 
Lebesgue measurable).  For any rigid transformation T on a subset of Euclidean space 
and any Lebesgue measurable A Í S, if TA Í S then Puniform(TA) = Puniform(A).   
 Uniform distributions are especially popular as prior probabilities, since they are 
thought by some to represent complete ignorance.  This is expressed by the much 
maligned Principle of Indifference (Keynes [2004]) and the more sophisticated Maximum 
Entropy Principle (Jaynes [1968]).  However, these principles do not pick out the uniform 
distribution uniquely unless we presuppose a privileged coordinate system or background 
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measure (Uffink [1995]).  Jaynes ([1973]) argues that the choice of prior probabilities can 
be narrowed or entirely determined by symmetry considerations.  For example, if a 
problem concerning a probability distribution over a dartboard does not state the position 
or orientation of the dartboard, then in order for the problem to have a unique solution, 
we must assume that that doesn’t matter, i.e., that the solution is invariant under 
translations and rotations.  Jaynes also argues that such considerations are likely to yield 
accurate predictions in physical applications, because distributions that have such 
symmetries require less “skill” (Jaynes’s scare quotes).  Jaynes’s views warrant serious 
doubts (see Gyenis and Rédei [forthcoming], §7, for a concise criticism), but they 
nonetheless exemplify the special applications that uniform distributions and rigid 
transformation invariance have. 
In any case, we normally expect it to be at least possible to assign rational 
credences or set up objective chances in such a way that, under some coordinate system, 
congruent point sets get the same value.  The well known Bertrand-type paradoxes have 
caused considerable trouble for the supposed privilege of symmetric credences.  They 
show that the Principle of Indifference can’t be applied without presupposing a privileged 
background measure or coordinate system.  In this sense symmetric credences are 
underdetermined.  But if regularity holds, symmetric credences aren’t just 
underdetermined or arbitrary, they’re ruled out altogether; we can’t rationally accept, and 
the world can’t exhibit, any translation- or rotation-invariant distribution, even given a 
privileged frame. 
 It is also worth noting that one of the motivations for regular probabilities is to 
make certain “fair” games possible, such as a fair infinite lottery (McCall and Armstrong 
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[1989], Wenmackers and Horsten [2013], Benci, Horsten, and Wenmackers [2013]).  But 
on one conception (e.g., Skyrms [1995]), fairness implies translation invariance, and we 
will now see that such invariance is incompatible with regularity.  
 
3 Failures of transformation invariance 
3.1 Rotations 
The following example is central to this paper, for the others all derive from it, though 
they each have specific points to make.7  Take a radial line segment—a spoke if you 
will—from centre of a dartboard to the rightmost point on its edge.  Call that spoke r0.  
So in polar coordinates, the spoke r0 = {(r, 0):  r Î [0, 1]}, assuming the dartboard has 
radius one.  We’re going to rotate this spoke around the board to obtain infinitely many 
spokes, and then take their union—the set containing all the points in those spokes.  So 
let T be an anti-clockwise rotation of one radian about the centre of the board, i.e., T(r, θ) 
= (r, θ + 1).  Now let R be the union of r0 and all its images by T, i.e.,  R = Èn Î NTnr0.  
Since one radian is incommensurable with a full revolution of 2π radians, the spokes Tnr0 
will never coincide; we will never have Tnr0 = Tmr0 for n ≠ m.  Thus R is a union of a 
countable infinity of spokes.  Now, if we rotate this set R by one radian, we obtain a 
proper subset TR = ⋃n > 1Tnr0.  It’s a proper subset because the first spoke r0 in R is not 
included in TR.8  Ergo, if a probability function P is regular, and therefore Euclidean, 
                                                
7 Since this paper was written in 2012, it has come to my attention that a similar example is mentioned in 
Bernstein and Wattenberg 1969, and since 2012, similar examples have been published elsewhere. 
8 Some respondents have questioned whether TR really is a proper subset of R, but the answer is clearly 
yes.  The metaphorical language of rotation might lead one to think these sets are in some sense the same 
set, just positioned in two different ways.  But these are sets of points, positions in a space, and these 
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then P must assign a larger probability to R than to the rotation TR, if it assigns them 
probabilities at all.  So rotation invariance fails for any regular probability defined on 
such sets.  
 Consider what this means:  It’s impossible to have a regular distribution on the 
dartboard that’s indifferent to rotations.  Suppose that the possible outcomes of a dart 
throw correspond in a natural physical way to the exact points in the plane of the 
dartboard.  (Again, we do not need any silliness about infinitely fine or perfectly 
symmetric darts; it is enough if the possible positions of the dart form a continuum.)  Let 
that P(A) be the probability that the dart lands in a position corresponding to a point in A.  
Regularity implies that P(TR) < P(R).  So if physical chances are regular, then the dart 
must somehow discriminate between point sets that are exactly alike except for an angle 
of rotation.  No matter how badly one throws the dart, no matter how little control is 
exercised, the darts will still discriminate in this incredibly fine way.  That’s physically 
implausible.  And if rational credences must be regular, they too must so discriminate; no 
matter how symmetric the dartboard is or how little we know about the thrower, we can’t 
rationally give the same credence to the dart hitting a point in R as we do for a rotation of 
R.  (In contrast, the standard uniform distribution on the dartboard is rotation invariant, so 
it assigns the same probability to R and TR, namely zero.)  
Again, defenders of regularity and Euclideanism might dismiss such rotation 
dependence as perfectly natural.  After all, R contains all of the points in TR as well as 
others, so from a Euclidean viewpoint, R should be assigned higher probability.  But as 
                                                                                                                                            
cannot be literally moved.  A rotation is just a function mapping some points to others, and the set R 
contains all of the points in TR as well as others.  So unless we adopt some radically unorthodox sort of set 
theory, TR is indeed a proper subset of R. 
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we have just seen, what seems natural from a regularist or Euclidean perspective has 
strange and limiting consequences.  It implies that we can’t have the sort of symmetry we 
expect from space-time invariant laws or unprejudiced beliefs.  Objective Bayesians like 
Jaynes would say that if we lack other information, then rationally, we must adopt 
rotationally symmetric probabilities for our dart experiment.  But even if we don’t accept 
Jaynes’s arguments, we can surely imagine situations where rotationally symmetric 
probabilities are appropriate.  Suppose a needle rotates at constant speed for many 
revolutions.  Elsewhere, in a small vacuum, pairs of particles spontaneously appear and 
annihilate each other.  Given a set A of angles, what is the probability that one such 
vacuum fluctuation begins exactly when our needle is at an angle q Î A?  Other things 
being equal, shouldn’t it be the same as the probability that a fluctuation begins when the 
needle is at an angle q Î TA, where T is a rotation?  But given regularity, this can’t be so 
for all sets of angles.   
And it gets worse.   
 
3.2 Translations 
Not only rotations on a disk, but also translations and reflections within an interval fail to 
preserve regular probabilities.  To see this, we will construct a set of points on the real 
line analogous to our set of spokes on the dartboard.  Let’s say a translation mod 1 is a 
transformation T on the half-open unit interval [0, 1) equivalent to first performing a 
translation and then taking the fractional part of the result.  That is, for some c Î [0, 1),  
   æ  x + c         if x + c < 1, 
Tx  =  x + c (mod 1)  =  í 
   è  x + c - 1   otherwise.   
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So a translation mod 1 is a “piecewise translation”, so to speak, made up of two 
translations:  T1, mapping [0, 1 - c) rightwards to [c, 1), and T2, mapping [1 - c, 1) 
leftwards to [0, c).   
Like rotations of the circle, translations mod 1 fail to preserve regular 
probabilities.  For suppose c is irrational.  Then the points Tn0 never coincide for different 
whole numbers n.  Now let X = {Tn0:  n Î N}.  Then TX = {Tn0:  n > 1} is a proper 
subset of X.  So if X is regular, then it’s Euclidean, and hence if P(X) and P(TX) are 
defined, P(TX) is less than P(X).  Thus translations mod 1 that are defined on such sets 
don’t preserve regular probabilities. 
Now, translations mod 1 aren’t translations per se, but the fact that translations 
mod 1 don’t preserve regular probabilities implies that true translations don’t either.9  
Assume that P(X), P(TX), and P([0, 1 - c)) are defined.  Then P is also defined for 
intersections and complements of these sets, by our assumptions (ii) and (iii).  Now let X1 
= X Ç [0, 1 - c) and X2 = X Ç [1 - c, 1).  Then T1X1 and T2X2 are disjoint.  Since P(X) ≠ 
P(TX), it follows by additivity that either P(X1) ≠ P(T1X1) or P(X2) ≠ P(T2X2).  So at least 
one of the translations T1 or T2 fails to preserve P.  Thus translations do not preserve 
weakly regular probabilities that are defined on simple sets like X, TX, and [0, 1 - c).  A 




                                                
9 To the best of my knowledge, this point has not been made elsewhere, and as I will argue, it is significant 
if we expect the laws of nature to be space-time invariant. 
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3.3 Reflections 
As a quick corollary to the above, we can infer that reflections on the real line don’t 
preserve regular probabilities either.   This is because every translation is a composition 
of two reflections.  We know that the translation T above does not preserve regular 
probabilities, and T can be written as a composition of two reflections R1 and R2, so at 
least one of these reflections must fail to preserver regular probabilities.  
 
3.4 Disjoint images 
Notice that we are no longer talking about cases where TB is a subset of B, and hence 
where the intuitions supporting regularity and Common Notion 5 directly justify a 
difference in probabilities.  We can’t say, “Of course the translated image is smaller than 
the original, because it’s a proper subset”; our T1X1 in §3.2 is not a subset of X1, and T2X2 
is not a subset of X2.  In fact, if P is defined on sufficiently small intervals in [0, 1) as 
well as the set X, then we can just split X up into smaller sets Xi such that each TXi is 
disjoint from Xi.  By additivity, then, there is at least one such set Xi such that P(Xi) ≠ 
P(TXi). 10  A similar argument applies to reflections.11  So if a regular probability measure 
is defined over sufficiently small intervals (as probability measures on a continuous space 
                                                
10 More formally, let T be a translation Tx = x + c.  Suppose A, TA Í [0, 1) and P(A) ≠ P(TA).  Choose n Î 
N so that 1/n < c.  For each whole number i < n, let Ai = A Ç [i/n, (i + 1)/n).  Then Ai and TAi are disjoint, 
and by finite additivity, åi Î {0, 1,..., n – 1}P(Ai) = P(A) ≠ P(TA) = åi Î {0, 1,..., n – 1}P(TAi).  So for at least one i, 
P(Ai) ≠ P(TAi).  Hence some translation of a set B, disjoint from B, has a different probability from B. 
11 Suppose T is a reflection about a fixed point c.  Let A1 = A Ç [0, c) and A2 = A Ç [c, 1).  Then A1 Ç TA1 = 
A2 Ç TA2 = Æ, and by additivity, P(A1) + P({c}) + P(A2) = P(A) ≠ P(TA) = P(TA1) + P(T{c}) + P(TA2).  
Since T(c) = c, either P(A1) ≠ P(TA1) or P(A2) ≠ P(TA2).  So in either case, we have disjoint reflection 
images with different probabilities.   
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normally are) then for any translation or reflection T there are disjoint sets A and TA that 
differ in probability.  This inconvenient inequity cannot be made more palatable by 
pointing out that TA is proper subsets of A, because it isn’t. 
Hence, on the regularist or Euclidean view, it is impossible to choose a random 
number in the interval so that no set is privileged over any of its disjoint translations, nor 
over its disjoint reflections.  We cannot throw a dart at a rectangular dartboard in such a 
way that it is as likely to hit a point with x-coordinate in a set A as in a disjoint translation 
or reflection TA.  Likewise, if quantum fluctuations occur in some vacuous region, there 
will be bounded sets A of points such that a fluctuation is slightly more likely to occur at 
a point in A than in certain disjoint translations and reflections of A, and similarly there 
will be bounded sets B of times such that a fluctuation is more likely to occur at a time t 
Î B than in certain disjoint translations and reflections of B.  Furthermore, if regularists 
about rational credence are right, the certain sets of events must be given higher credence 
than some of their disjoint translations and reflections.   
 
4 Bearing on the regularity debate 
4.1 Williamson’s coin flips 
Let us now relate these observations to the ongoing debate over regular probabilities.  
Williamson [2007] cosnsiders a countably infinite sequence of independent coin flips.  
Let’s call this sequence of flips s.  He then considers the proper subsequence s' beginning 
with the second flip in s.  Let us write H(x) for the proposition that a given sequence x of 
coin flips comes out all heads.  For the regularist, 0 < P(H(s)) < P(H(s')), since (i) H(s) is 
possible and (ii) the outcomes where H(s') occurs are a proper subset of those in which 
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H(s) occurs.  Williamson argues very effectively (though in a tentative, open-minded 
spirit) that this is mistaken.  Assume the two sequences of flips are identical in their 
qualitative physical properties.  If physical circumstances determine chances (and by the 
Principal Principle, well informed rational credences), then P(H(s)) should not differ at 
all from P(H(s')), even by an infinitesimal.  Likewise, if an entirely separate sequence t of 
coin flips begins at the same time as s' and carries on in parallel, then P(H(t)) should be 
the same as P(H(s)) and P(H(s')), provided the physical circumstances are the same in all 
three cases. 
 
4.2 Weintraub’s criticism 
Weintraub [2008] responds to Williamson by pointing out that the coin flips in s' and t 
occur at different times from those in s.  The former times are a proper subset of the 
latter.  In this way the physical circumstances are different, so there is no paradox if the 
respective probabilities differ.    
Stated that way, such a response misses an important point.  It is true that there is 
a physical difference between the two sequences of coin flips, but the difference seems to 
concern only only the times at which they occur, and it is a time-honoured principle that 
the laws of physics do not depend on or change over time.  If we find that physical 
systems behave differently at different times, we look for some other change in the 
physical circumstances besides the time itself.  This may be only a methodological 
convention (Poincaré [1911]) vulnerable to eventual rejection (Quine [1951]), but it is a 
usefully simplifying one, and to drop it would dramatically change our picture of how the 
world works.  It would amount to saying that the way things behave changes over time 
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for no underlying reason.  So while Williamson’s argument doesn’t show that regularity 
is logically paradoxical, it puts the regularist in a very awkward dilemma:  She must 
either abandon the standard and sensible principle that physical laws are unchanging and 
time invariant, or deny that probabilities are determined by physical circumstances and 
laws.12 
But Weintraub might argue that this is not so, on the grounds that the difference 
between s, s', and t is not just a difference of in when the flips occur.  The asymmetric 
relations of proper inclusion between s and s' and between the times of the flips in s and 
t, can themselves be seen as differences of physical circumstance, and might be 
responsible for the differences in probabilities.  Weintraub has further suggested 
(personal communication) that we might understand such differences in terms of 
duration.  If a rod is heated for a longer duration than another rod, the resulting effects are 
different.  And Williamson’s sequences s' and t can be thought of as shorter in duration 
than s, since they start later.  Of course, this is only true under a very non-standard 
Euclidean notion of duration.  Conventionally we would say that the durations of all three 
sequences are infinite, or perhaps undefined, but not unequal.  So Weintraub’s suggestion 
implies Euclideanism not only for probabilities but for durations too, but regularists 
might be perfectly comfortable with this.  
                                                
12 Haverkamp and Schulz [2012] offer a related critique of Weintraub’s argument.  They argue that separate 
runs of the same physical device or set-up ought to produce outcomes with the same probabilities 
regardless of when it is set running.  However, there are difficulties with the idea of having the same 
physical device implement an infinite process in two entirely separate instances.  Each run could be 
executed in finite time if the coin flips occur at shorter and shorter intervals, as Haverkamp and Schulz 
suggest, but then we lose the strong parallel between a sequence of flips and a proper subsequence.  The 
objections to Weintraub made here are more general and avoid these problems.   
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We might reply to Weintraub that, even if the sequences differ in physical 
respects other than merely occurring at different times, they still differ only in respects 
that are entirely due to occurring at different times.  Regularity implies that we could alter 
the probability that a sequence of coin flips comes out all heads just by beginning the 
sequence a little earlier or later, and doing nothing else differently.  This already conflicts 
with the spirit of the principle of time-invariance. 
But we need not press that point.  The examples presented above render 
Weintraub’s objections irrelevant.  Regularity implies that a set of possible outcomes for 
a single finite-time trial will differ in probability from disjoint translations and rotations 
of that set of outcomes.  In the case of vacuum fluctuations, for example, we considered 
two sets of times, exactly alike in structure and duration, where neither contains or 
overlaps the other, and yet the probability that a fluctuation occurs at a time in one set 
must differ from the probability that a fluctuation occurs at a time in the other set.  We 
cannot explain this away by appeal to the subset relation or a difference in duration; the 
sets only differ in their times.  We also considered sets of points in space, exactly alike in 
structure, where neither contains ore overlaps the other, and even for a single 
instantaneous event (the very beginning of the first vacuum fluctuation to occur in either 
set within a given time span), the corresponding probabilities must differ, if regularity 
holds.  This runs against another principle:  The laws of physics don’t vary across space, 
either.  Both examples contradict the relativistic principle of space-time invariance, 




4.3 Restricting invariance to finite events 
Another move the regularist might make in response to Williamson is to suggest that the 
local laws governing individual finite-time processes are time invariant, as tradition 
would have it, but the laws (if any) governing the probabilities of infinite sequences of 
events are not.  In fact, it is an assumption of Williamson’s examples that the outcomes of 
the individual coin tosses are mutually independent and all have exactly the same 
probability, namely one half.  So the regularist must hold that the probabilities of infinite 
sequences of independent events are not determined by the probabilities of the individual 
outcomes in the sequence.  In particular, probabilities are partly determined by the 
principle of regularity itself, and under regularity, P(H(s)) must be smaller than P(H(s')).  
But this move too is rendered irrelevant by our new examples, for they do not 
involve infinite sequences of events.  Rather they concern individual events in finite 
space-time.  Granted, these events—the dart hitting a point in a given set, or a vacuum 
fluctuation occurring at a time in a given set, for example—are countably infinite unions 
of individual micro-events, such as the dart hitting a particular exact point.  Given the 
fact that we are not insisting on countable additivity, one might suggest that the 
probabilities of these individual outcomes do not determine those of the unions.  But to 
hold that the probabilities of these unions might vary across time and space despite being 
bounded and exactly alike in structure flies in the face of space-time invariance as it is 
normally understood.  After all, the events that the discipline of physics predicts and for 
which it gives probabilities are normally themselves infinite unions of micro-events.  
Quantum mechanics for example tells us about the probability that a particle 
measurement will read ‘spin-up’ under certain circumstances.  But the event of a ‘spin-
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up’ outcome is a union of many micro-events in which the particle might have any of 
various positions, velocities, and quantum states, and of course the experimenter, other 
nearby objects, and the rest of the universe might also be in various states.  So to 
conclude that infinitary unions of exact states are not determined by space-time invariant 
laws would be to throw out the very sort of space-time invariance that physics and 
philosophy of physics have long accepted.  Of course, those disciplines might just have it 
wrong, but to imply this is an enormous burden for regularity arguments to bear.   
 
4.4 Physicality and meaning 
Yet another possible objection to Williamson is that his infinite sequences of coin flips 
are unrealistic or even physically impossible.  One cannot flip the same coin under the 
same circumstances infinitely many times, and arguably, one cannot perform any 
experiment infinitely many times.  Our examples have also circumvented this objection.  
They show that regular probabilities violate rigid transformation invariance even for a 
single experiment, conducted in a small region of space-time.   
But one might raise a related objection against our new examples, to the effect 
that they too are unrealistic, or that any probabilities applied to them are meaningless, 
since darts do not strike exact points and vacuum fluctuations do not occur at exact times, 
and even if they did, we would never be able to measure such things with sufficient 
accuracy to determine whether or not they fell within sets like our R and X above.  After 
all, those sets are nowhere dense—riddled with gaps in such a way that membership in 
such a set depends critically on the exact outcome. And it may be that there are no exact 
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continuous magnitudes at all in the real world, or no circumstance where we can 
determine whether a physical magnitude lies in a given nowhere dense set.  
To this I will concede uncertainty.  I do not know whether there are exact physical 
quantities whose ranges of possible values include nowhere dense sets like R and X.  Nor 
am I certain that chances or credences of such events are meaningful.  That would seem 
to depend on the details of what exactly chances and credences are taken to be.13  But 
regularists themselves have adopted infinitesimal and hyperreal probabilities precisely in 
order to save regularity in the face of such idealised and experience-transcending 
examples.  If it were not for examples like the dart throw described in the introduction 
(which assumes a continuum of possible outcomes), infinite sequences of coin tosses, and 
lotteries with infinitely many equally likely outcomes, regularists would have no need for 
hyperreal probabilities.  Indeed, much of the literature supporting regular or Euclidean 
probabilities concerns just such cases (e.g., exact dart throws:  Bernstein and Wattenberg 
[1969]; infinite coin tosses:  Lewis [1980], p. 270, Gwiazda [2008]; infinite lotteries:  
McCall and Armstrong [1989], Gwaizda [2010], Wenmackers and Horsten [2013], Benci, 
Horsten, and Wenmackers [2013]), and one of the chief benefits of Benci, Horsten, and 
Wenmackers’ NAP theory, as discussed above, is to define probabilities even for highly 
abstract non-measurable sets in the continuum.  So if we are to dismiss such examples as 
unrealistic or meaningless, then the benefits of hyperreal probabilities go with them.  
Regularists might then avoid many problems, but not by expanding the range of 
probability values.  Rather they would do so by dismissing the entire discipline of 
                                                
13 Thanks to ------ ----- for pressing this point with regard to the notion of chance. 
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continuous probability theory as unphysical or meaningless, despite the important role 
that it plays in the treatment of many real-world problems.  
 
5 Conclusion 
Requiring probabilities to be regular would be very costly.  It would mean that in some 
cases we could not assign the same probability to perfectly symmetrical sets of outcomes, 
even when these sets are simple, countable, and constructive.  If the events corresponding 
to such sets have objective physical chances, then regularity implies that those chances 
are not determined by space-time invariant laws.  So given regularity, either (i) the laws 
of physics are not space-time invariant, (ii) chances are not determined by the laws of 
physics, or (iii) such events have no chances at all.  Any of these is a difficult 
consequence to accept. 
For rational subjective credences, regularity creates another dilemma.  The 
regularist claims that it is irrational to be so convinced of a contingent proposition that 
one is willing to bet everything for an arbitrarily small return (or none at all), or to be un-
swayed by any amount of statistical evidence (as zero credence and Bayesianism would 
imply).  But the objective Bayesian claims that in certain situations it is irrational to 
assign credences that are not translation- or rotation-invariant.  Both cannot be right.  And 
even if we accept that objective Bayesianism is false, regularity implies more.  It means 
that in some cases we can’t assign the same probability to perfectly symmetric events, no 
matter how symmetric our knowledge of them may be. 
To these remarks the devoted regularist might reply, “So be it.  The arguments for 
regularity are ironclad, however inconvenient their consequences may be.  We must 
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simply accept them, and re-think everything else.”  But given the consequences, the 
arguments for regularity should be scrutinised closely, and I suspect we will find chinks 
in their armour.   
If indeed those arguments can be undone, or they are not strong enough to bear 
the burden of their awkward consequences, then this also tells us something about the 
new Euclidean theories of set size.  It means that in one of the key applications claimed 
for them—non-standard probability measures—they are as limited and uninformative as 
they are for set size itself.  
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